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By reducing the threat of a hostile takeover, business combination (BC) laws weaken corporate governance
and increase the opportunity for managerial slack. Consistent with the notion that competition mitigates
managerial slack, we find that while firms in non-competitive industries experience a significant drop
in operating performance after the laws' passage, firms in competitive industries experience no significant
effect. When we examine which agency problem competition mitigates, we find evidence in support
of a "quiet-life" hypothesis. Input costs, wages, and overhead costs all increase after the laws' passage,
and only so in non-competitive industries. Similarly, when we conduct event studies around the dates
of the first newspaper reports about the BC laws, we find that while firms in non-competitive industries
experience a significant stock price decline, firms in competitive industries experience a small and
insignificant stock price impact.
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Going back to Adam Smith, economists have long argued that managerial slack is ﬁrst and
foremost an issue for ﬁrms in non-competitive industries. As Sir John Hicks succinctly put
it, managers of such ﬁrms tend to enjoy the “quiet life”.1 By contrast, managers of ﬁrms in
competitive industries are under constant pressure to reduce slack and improve eﬃciency:
“Over the long pull, there is one simple criterion for the survival of a business en-
terprise: Proﬁts must be nonnegative. No matter how strongly managers prefer to
pursue other objectives [...] failure to satisfy this criterion means ultimately that a
ﬁrm will disappear from the economic scene” (Scherer, 1980).
The hypothesis that competition mitigates managerial slack, provided it is true, has several
important implications. First, topics that have been studied extensively over the past decades,
such as managerial agency problems resulting in deviations from value-maximizing behavior,
m i g h th a v el i t t l eb e a r i n go nﬁrms in competitive industries. Second, researchers who want to
study the eﬀects of governance could beneﬁt from interacting governance proxies with measures
of competition. Third, and perhaps most important, policy eﬀorts to improve corporate gov-
ernance could beneﬁt from focusing primarily on non-competitive industries. Moreover, such
eﬀorts could be broadened to also include measures aimed at improving an industry’s competi-
tiveness, such as deregulation and antitrust laws.
We test the hypothesis that competition mitigates managerial slack by using exogenous vari-
ation in corporate governance in the form of 30 business combination (BC) laws passed between
1985 and 1991 on a state-by-state basis. BC laws impose a moratorium on certain transactions,
especially mergers and asset sales, between a large shareholder and the ﬁrm for a period ranging
from three to ﬁve years after the large shareholder’s stake has passed a prespeciﬁed threshold.
This moratorium hinders corporate raiders from gaining access to the target ﬁrm’s assets for
1“The best of all monopoly proﬁts is a quiet life” (Hicks, 1935). Similarly, “Monopoly [...] is a great enemy to
good management” (Smith, 1776). Despite its intuitive appeal, attempts to formalize the notion that competition
mitigates managerial slack have proven diﬃcult. For example, while Hart (1983) shows that competition reduces
managerial slack, Scharfstein (1988) shows that Hart’s result can be easily reversed. Subsequent models generally
ﬁnd ambiguous eﬀects (e.g., Hermalin, 1992; Schmidt, 1997). In an early review of the literature, Holmström and
Tirole (1989) conclude that “apparently, the simple idea that product market competition reduces slack is not as
easy to formalize as one might think.”
2the purpose of paying down acquisition debt, thus making hostile takeovers more diﬃcult and
often impossible. By reducing the threat of a hostile takeover, BC laws thus weaken corporate
governance and increase the opportunity for managerial slack.2
Using the passage of BC laws as a source of identifying variation, we examine if these
laws have a diﬀerent eﬀect on ﬁrms in competitive and non-competitive industries. We obtain
three main results. First, consistent with the notion that BC laws increase the opportunity for
managerial slack, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms’ return on assets (ROA) drops by 0.6 percentage points on
average. Given that the average ROA in our sample is about 7.4 percent, this implies a drop
in ROA of about 8.1 percent. Second, the drop in ROA is larger for ﬁrms in non-competitive
industries. While ROA drops by 1.5 percentage points in the highest HHI (Herﬁndahl-Hirschman
index) quintile, it only drops by 0.1 percentage points in the lowest HHI quintile. Third, the eﬀect
is close to zero and statistically insigniﬁcant for ﬁrms in highly competitive industries. Thus,
while the opportunity for managerial slack increases equally across all industries, managerial
slack appears to increase only in non-competitive industries, but not in highly competitive
industries, where competitive pressure enforces discipline on management. It is in this sense
that our results suggest that competition mitigates managerial slack.
Our contribution is not to introduce a novel source of exogenous variation. Many papers have
used the passage of BC laws as a source of exogenous variation, including Garvey and Hanka
(1999), Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999, 2003), Cheng, Nagar, and Rajan (2005), and Rauh
(2006). Rather, the contribution is to show that exogenous variation in corporate governance
has a diﬀerent eﬀect on ﬁrms in competitive and non-competitive industries.
ROA is an accounting measure that can be manipulated. Accordingly, a drop in ROA after
the passage of the BC laws does not necessarily imply a reduction in operating proﬁtability. It
could simply reﬂe c tac h a n g ei nt h ee x t e n tt ow h i c hﬁrms manage their earnings. While it is
diﬃcult to completely rule out this alternative story, we can oﬀer some pieces of evidence that
are inconsistent with it. First, if a BC law is passed only a few months prior to the ﬁscal year’s
end, it would seem hard to imagine that the current year’s ROA should drop by much, given
that most of the ﬁscal year is already over. In this case, a signiﬁcant drop in ROA might be
indicative of an earnings management story. However, we ﬁnd that if a BC law is passed late in
2“The reduced fear of a hostile takeover means that an important disciplining device has become less eﬀective
and that corporate governance overall was reduced” (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003).
3the ﬁscal year, the drop in ROA is small and insigniﬁcant. Second, using discretionary accruals
as proxies for earnings management, we ﬁnd no evidence that ﬁrms’ earnings management has
changed after the passage of the BC laws. In a similar vein, it could be that the drop in ROA
reﬂects a change in ﬁrms’ asset mix towards lower risk/lower return projects. However, we ﬁnd
that neither cash-ﬂow volatility nor ﬁrms’ asset beta has changed after the laws’ passage.
Our ﬁndings are robust across many alternative speciﬁcations. Our main competition mea-
sure is the HHI based on 3-digit SIC codes computed from Compustat based on ﬁrms’ sales. We
obtain similar results if we use HHIs based on 2-digit and 4-digit SIC codes, asset-based HHIs,
lagged HHIs (up to ﬁve years), and the average HHI from 1976 to 1984 (the ﬁrst BC law was
passed in 1985). We also obtain similar results if we use the Census HHI, which includes both
public and private ﬁrms, import penetration, and industry net proﬁt margin (or Lerner index)
as our competition measure. Finally, we obtain similar results if we run “horse races” between
the HHI and other ﬁrm or industry characteristics for which the HHI might be merely proxy-
ing, if we exclude Delaware ﬁrms from the treatment group, if we use alternative performance
measures, such as return on equity and net proﬁt margin, if we restrict the sample to ﬁrms that
are present during the entire period from 1981 to 1995 (to purge the sample of entry and exit
eﬀects), if we use diﬀerent sample periods, and if we interact all covariates with time dummies
and treatment state dummies.
Our identiﬁcation strategy beneﬁts from a general lack of congruence between a ﬁrm’s in-
dustry, state of location, and state of incorporation. For instance, the state of incorporation of
a ﬁrm says little about the ﬁrm’s industry. Likewise, less than 38 percent of the ﬁrms in our
sample are incorporated in their state of location. This lack of congruence allows us to control
for local and industry shocks and thus to separate out the eﬀects of shocks contemporaneous
with the BC laws from the eﬀects of the laws themselves. Among other things, this alleviates
concerns that the BC laws might be the outcome of lobbying at the local and industry level,
respectively. To address concerns that the BC laws might be the outcome of broad-based lob-
bying at the state of incorporation level, we examine if the laws had already an “eﬀect” prior to
their passage. We ﬁnd not evidence for such an “eﬀect”.
While the above results suggest that competition mitigates managerial agency problems,
they do not say which agency problem is being mitigated. Does competition curb managerial
empire building? Or does it prevent managers from enjoying a “quiet life” by forcing them
4to “undertake cognitively diﬃcult activities” (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003)? We ﬁnd no
evidence for empire building. Capital expenditures, asset growth, PPE growth, the volume
of acquisitions made by a ﬁrm, and the likelihood of being an acquirer are all unaﬀected by
the passage of the BC laws. In contrast, we ﬁnd that input costs, overhead costs, and wages
all increase after the laws’ passage, and only so in non-competitive industries. Our results
are broadly consistent with a “quiet life” hypothesis, whereby managers insulated from hostile
takeovers and competitive pressure seek to avoid cognitively diﬃcult activities, such as haggling
with input suppliers, labor unions, and organizational units within the company demanding
bigger overhead budgets.
To see whether the eﬀect also shows up in stock prices, we conduct event studies around
the dates of the ﬁrst newspaper reports about the BC laws. Across all industries, we ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of −0.32%. When we compute CARs separately
for low- and high-HHI portfolios, we ﬁnd that the CAR for the low-HHI portfolio is small
and insigniﬁcant, while the CAR for the high-HHI portfolio is large (−0.54%) and signiﬁcant.
Similarly, if we compute CARs for low-, medium-, and high-HHI portfolios, we ﬁnd that the
CAR for the low-HHI portfolio is small and insigniﬁcant, while the CARs for the medium- and
high-HHI portfolios are large (−0.44% and −0.67%)a n ds i g n i ﬁcant.
Our empirical methodology closely follows Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), who consider
the same 30 BC laws as we do. Using plant-level data from the Census Bureau, they investi-
gate the laws’ eﬀect on wages, employment, plant births and deaths, investment, total factor
productivity, and return on capital.3 We extend their analysis by investigating whether the
laws have a diﬀerent eﬀect on ﬁrms in competitive and non-competitive industries. In terms of
research question, our paper is closely related to Nickell (1996), who ﬁnds that more competition
is associated with higher productivity growth in a sample of U.K. manufacturing ﬁrms.4 While
consistent with a managerial agency explanation, this result is also consistent with alternative
explanations that are unrelated to corporate governance. For instance, ﬁrms in competitive
3Using plant-level data from the Census Bureau is superior to using Compustat data in many respects. For
instance, it allows to estimate total factor productivity. Moreover, it allows to include both plant ﬁxed eﬀects
and state of incorporation ﬁxed eﬀects, thus permitting a tighter identiﬁcation.
4See also Bloom and van Reenen (2007), who ﬁnd that poor management practices are more prevalent in
non-competitive industries, and Guadalupe and Pérez-González (2005), who ﬁnd that competition aﬀects private
beneﬁts of control, as measured by the voting premium between shares with diﬀerential voting rights.
5industries might have higher productivity growth because there are more industry peers from
whose successes and failures they can learn. Our paper is also related to a growing literature
that documents a link between competition and ﬁrm-level governance instruments, such as man-
agerial incentive schemes (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999), board structure (Karuna, 2008), and
ﬁrm-level takeover defenses (Cremers, Nair, and Peyer, 2008).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and empirical
methodology. Section 3 presents our main results. Section 4 examines which agency problem
competition mitigates. Section 5 presents event-study evidence. Section 6 concludes.
2. Data
2.1. Sample selection
Our main data source is Standard and Poor’s Compustat. To be included in our sample, a
ﬁrm must be located and incorporated in the United States. We exclude all observations for
which the book value of assets or net sales are either missing or negative. We also exclude
regulated utility ﬁrms (SIC 4900-4999).5 The sample period is from 1976 to 1995, which is the
same period as in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003).
The above selection criteria leave us with 10,960 ﬁrms and 81,095 ﬁrm-year observations.
Table 1 shows how many ﬁrms are located and incorporated in each state. The state of location,
as deﬁned by Compustat, indicates the state in which a ﬁrm’s headquarters are located. The
state of incorporation is a legal concept and determines which BC law, if any, applies to a
given ﬁrm. While Compustat only reports the state of incorporation for the latest available
year, anecdotal evidence suggests that changes in states of incorporation during the sample
period are rare (Romano, 1993). To gain further conﬁdence, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003)
randomly sampled 200 ﬁrms from their panel and checked (using Moody’s Industrial Manual)i f
any of these ﬁrms had changed their state of incorporation. Only three ﬁrms had changed their
state of incorporation, and all of them to Delaware. Importantly, all three changes predated the
1988 Delaware BC law by several years. Similarly, Cheng, Nagar, and Rajan (2005) report that
none of the 587 Forbes 500 ﬁrms in their panel changed their state of incorporation during the
sample period from 1984 to 1991.
5Whether we exclude regulated utilities makes no diﬀerence for our results. We also obtain similar results if
we exclude ﬁnancial ﬁrms (SIC 6000-6999), and if we restrict the sample to manufacturing ﬁrms (SIC 2000-3999).
62.2. Deﬁnition of variables and summary statistics
Our main measure of competition is the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman index (HHI), which is well-
grounded in industrial organization theory (see Tirole, 1988). A higher HHI implies weaker





where sijt is the market share of ﬁrm i in industry j in year t. Market shares are computed
from Compustat based on ﬁrms’ sales (item #12). In robustness checks, we also compute
market shares based on ﬁrms’ assets. Our benchmark measure is the HHI based on 3-digit
SIC codes. The 3-digit partition is a compromise between too coarse a partition, in which
unrelated industries may be pooled together, and too narrow a partition, which may be subject
to misclassiﬁcation. For example, the 2-digit SIC code 38 (instruments and related products)
pools together ophthalmic goods such as intra ocular lenses (3-digit SIC code 385) and watches,
clocks, clockwork operated devices and parts (3-digit SIC code 387), two industries that unlikely
compete with each other. On the other hand, the 4-digit partition treats upholstered wood
household furniture (4-digit SIC code 2512) and non-upholstered wood household furniture (4-
digit SIC code 2511) as unrelated industries, although common sense suggests that they compete
with each other. We consider HHIs based on 2- and 4-digit SIC codes in robustness checks.
There, we also consider alternative competition measures, such as the Census HHI, industry
net proﬁt margin (or Lerner index), and import penetration. Finally, a look at the empirical
distribution of the HHI shows that it has a (small) “spike” at the right endpoint, which points to
misclassiﬁcation. To correct for this misclassiﬁcation, we drop 2.5% of the ﬁrm-year observations
at the right tail of the HHI distribution.6
Our main measure of operating performance is return on assets (ROA), which is deﬁned as
operating income before depreciation and amortization (EBITDA, item #13) divided by total
assets (item #6). Since ROA is a ratio, it can take on extreme values (in either direction) if
the scaling variable becomes too small. To mitigate the eﬀect of outliers, we drop 1% of the
6The 3-digit partition comprises 270 industries. In some cases, the industry deﬁnition is rather narrow, with
the eﬀect that some industries consist of a single ﬁrm, even though common sense suggests that they should be
pooled together with other industries. By construction, these industries have an HHI of one, which explains the
small “spike” at the right endpoint of the empirical HHI distribution. Dropping 2.5% of the ﬁrm-year observations
at the right tail of the distribution corrects for this misclassiﬁcation.
7ﬁrm-year observations at each tail of the ROA distribution. Panel (A) of Table 2 presents
summary statistics for the mean, median, and range of observed ROA values for the trimmed
sample. We consider alternative methods to deal with ROA outliers in robustness checks. Also
in robustness checks, we consider alternative measures of operating performance, such as return
on equity and net proﬁt margin.
Panel (B) of Table 2 provides summary statistics for ﬁr m si n c o r p o r a t e di ns t a t e st h a t
passed a BC law during the sample period (“Eventually BC”) and ﬁrms incorporated in states
that never passed a BC law (“Never BC”). As is shown, ﬁrms in passing states are slightly bigger
and older on average, which raises the question of whether the control group is an appropriate
one. There are several reasons why this should not be a concern. First, due to the staggering
of the BC laws over time, ﬁrms in the “Eventually BC” group are ﬁrst control ﬁrms (before the
l a w )a n dt h e nt r e a t m e n tﬁrms. Second, we control for size and age in all our regressions. Size
is the natural logarithm of total assets, while age is the natural logarithm of one plus the ﬁrm’s
age, which is the number of years the ﬁrm has been in Compustat. Third, we show in robustness
checks that results are similar if we limit the control group to ﬁrms incorporated in treatment
states that have not yet passed a BC law.
2.3. Empirical methodology
We examine whether the passage of 30 BC laws between 1985 and 1991 has a diﬀerent eﬀect
on ﬁrms in competitive and non-competitive industries. We estimate
yijklt = αi + αt + β1BCkt + β2HHIjt + β3 (BCkt × HHIjt)+γ0Xijklt +  ijklt, (2)
where i indexes ﬁrms, j indexes industries, k indexes states of incorporation, l indexes states of
location, t indexes time, yijklt is the dependent variable of interest (mainly ROA), αi and αt are
ﬁrm and year ﬁxed eﬀects, BCkt is a dummy that equals one if a BC law has been passed in
state k by time t, HHIjt is the HHI associated with industry j at time t, Xijklt is a vector of
controls, and  ijklt is the error term.
For any given HHI, we can compute the total eﬀect of the BC laws as β1 + β3HHI. The
coeﬃcient β1 on the BC dummy measures the (limit) eﬀect as the HHI goes to zero, implying
that it measures the laws’ eﬀect on ﬁrms in highly competitive industries. The coeﬃcient β3
measures how the eﬀect varies with the degree of competition. The coeﬃcient β2 measures the
direct eﬀect of competition. In the case where the dependent variable is ROA, the conjecture
8is that ﬁrms in more competitive industries (lower HHI) make fewer proﬁts, implying that the
coeﬃcient β2 should be positive.
We estimate equation (2) using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence (DDD) approach. In
the case where the dependent variable is ROA, the ﬁrst diﬀerence compares ROA before and after
the passage of the BC laws separately for ﬁrms in the control and treatment group. This yields
two diﬀerences, one for the control group and one for the treatment groups. The second diﬀerence
takes the diﬀerence between these two diﬀerences. The result is an estimate of the eﬀect of the
BC laws on ﬁrms’ ROA. The interaction term BC ×HHI estimates a third diﬀerence, namely,
whether the laws’ eﬀect is diﬀerent for ﬁrms in competitive and non-competitive industries.
Importantly, the staggered passage of the BC laws implies that the control group is not restricted
to ﬁrms incorporated in states that never passed a BC law. The control group includes all
ﬁr m si n c o r p o r a t e di ns t a t e st h a th a v en o tp a s s e daB Cl a wb yt i m et. Thus, it includes ﬁrms
incorporated in states that never passed a BC law as well as ﬁrms incorporated in states that
passed a law after time t.
Our identiﬁcation strategy beneﬁts from a general lack of congruence between a ﬁrm’s in-
dustry, state of location, and state of incorporation. For instance, the state of incorporation of
a ﬁrm says little about the ﬁrm’s industry. Likewise, Table 1 shows that only 37.8% of all ﬁrms
in our sample are incorporated in their state of location. BC laws, in turn, apply to all ﬁrms in
a given state of incorporation, regardless of their state of location or industry. Ideally, this lack
of congruence should allow us to fully control for any industry shocks and shocks speciﬁct oa
state of location by including a full set of industry dummies and state of location dummies, each
interacted with time dummies. Unfortunately, computational diﬃculties make it practically
infeasible to estimate a speciﬁcation with so many independent variables. Instead, we follow
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and control for local and industry shocks by including a full
set of time-varying industry- and state-year controls, which are computed as the mean of the
dependent variable in the ﬁrm’s industry and state of location, respectively, in a given year,
excluding the ﬁrm itself.
Controlling for local and industry shocks helps us to separate out the eﬀects of shocks
contemporaneous with the BC laws from the eﬀects of the laws themselves. This addresses
several important concerns. First, our estimate of the laws’ eﬀect could be biased, reﬂecting
in part the eﬀects of contemporaneous shocks. Second, our results could be spurious, coming
9entirely from contemporaneous shocks. Third, and perhaps most important, economic conditions
could inﬂuence the passage of the BC laws. For example, poor economic conditions in a particular
state might induce local ﬁrms to lobby for an anti-takeover law to gain better protection from
hostile takeovers. While the inclusion of state- and industry-year controls mitigates concerns
that the BC laws are the outcome of lobbying at the local and industry level, respectively, it
remains the possibility that lobbying occurs at the state of incorporation level. We will address
this issue in detail in Section 3.2.
The HHI is an imperfect measure of competition. The classic example is that in which
every city has one cement company. In that case, there would be many cement companies in the
industry, but given the high transportation costs for cement, each company would eﬀectively be a
local monopoly. Evidently, the HHI would seriously misrepresent the true level of competition in
that situation. More generally, this concern applies whenever markets are regionally segmented.
However, as long as the resulting measurement error is not systematically related to the passage
of the BC laws, which is a reasonable assumption to make, it is unlikely that it will bias our
coeﬃcients. Rather, it will make it only harder for us to ﬁnd any signiﬁcant results.
In all our regressions, we cluster standard errors at the state of incorporation level. This
accounts for arbitrary correlations of the error terms i) across diﬀerent ﬁr m si nag i v e ns t a t eo f
incorporation and year (cross-sectional correlation), ii) across diﬀerent ﬁrms in a given state of
incorporation over time (across-ﬁrm serial correlation), and iii) within the same ﬁrm over time
(within-ﬁrm serial correlation) (see Petersen, 2009). Cross-sectional correlation is a concern
because all ﬁrms in a given state of incorporation are aﬀected by the same “shock,” namely, the
passage of the BC law. Serial correlation is a concern because the BC dummy changes little over
time, being zero before and one after the passage of the BC law. We will consider alternative
ways to account for cross-sectional and serial correlation in robustness checks.
3. Results
3.1. Main results
Panel (A) of Table 3 contains our main results. Column [1] shows the average eﬀect of the
passage of the BC laws across all ﬁrms. The coeﬃcient on the BC dummy is −0.006, implying
that ROA drops by 0.6 percentage points on average. Given that the average (median) ROA in
our sample is about 7.4 percent (10.4 percent), this implies a drop in ROA of 8.1 percent for the
10average ﬁrm and 5.8 percent for the median ﬁrm. The control variables all have the expected
signs. The industry- and state-year controls are both positive and signiﬁcant, which underscores
the importance of controlling for industry and local shocks. The coeﬃcients on size and the
HHI are both positive, while the coeﬃcient on age is negative.7 The weak signiﬁcance of the
HHI as a control variable in column [1] is due to the fact that it captures two diﬀerent eﬀects
of competition on proﬁts, which have opposite signs. As we will see below, when we disentangle
these two eﬀects, they will both become signiﬁcant.
In column [2], we examine whether the drop in ROA is diﬀerent for ﬁrms in competitive
and non-competitive industries. The interaction term between the BC dummy and the HHI
has a coeﬃcient of −0.033 (t−statistic of 4.95), which implies that the drop in ROA is larger
for ﬁrms in non-competitive industries. (That these ﬁrms have higher proﬁt st ob e g i nw i t hi s
already accounted for by the inclusion of the HHI as a control variable.) As for the economic
magnitude of the eﬀect, an increase in the HHI by one standard deviation is associated with a
drop in ROA of −0.033×0.156 = −0.005, or 0.5 percentage points. We can alternatively divide
the sample into HHI quintiles. The mean value of the HHI in the lowest and highest quintile is
0.067 and 0.479, respectively. Hence, while ROA drops by 1.5 percentage points in the highest
HHI quintile, it only drops by 0.1 percentage points in the lowest HHI quintile. Of equal interest
is the fact that the BC dummy is close to zero and insigniﬁcant. Since the BC dummy captures
the limit eﬀect as the HHI goes to zero, this implies that the passage of the BC laws has no
signiﬁcant eﬀect on ﬁrms in highly competitive industries. Finally, the regression in column
[2] allows us to disentangle the two opposite eﬀects of competition on proﬁts. The positive
coeﬃcient on the HHI as a control variable implies that the direct eﬀect is negative, i.e., ﬁrms
in more competitive industries make fewer proﬁts. In contrast, the negative coeﬃcient on the
interaction term between the BC dummy and the HHI implies that the indirect (or “managerial-
slack”) eﬀect is positive, i.e., ﬁrms in more competitive industries experience a smaller drop in
ROA after the laws’ passage.
7We have experimented with squared terms for size, age, and the HHI (both alone and interacted with the
BC dummy) to capture possible non-linearities. As is shown in Table 3, the squared term for size is negative
and signiﬁcant, which implies that the relation between size and ROA is concave. The squared term for the HHI
had the “right” sign (negative as a control variable and positive when interacted with the BC dummy) but was
insigniﬁcant. The squared term for age was signiﬁcant but rendered the coeﬃcient on age itself insigniﬁcant with
virtually no eﬀect on the other variables. All our results are similar if we include age-squared instead of age.
11The positive coeﬃcient on the HHI as a control variable also mitigates potential endogeneity
concerns related to the HHI. A main concern here is reverse causation. Speciﬁcally, a drop
in proﬁts, possibly caused by the passage of the BC laws, might lead to ﬁrm exits and thus
higher industry concentration (higher HHI). As already pointed out by Nickell (1996), reverse
causation would thus predict that the HHI as a control variable has a negative sign. However,
the coeﬃcient is positive, which is consistent with the (conventional) interpretation that ﬁrms
in competitive industries make fewer proﬁts.
In column [3], we use HHI dummies in place of a continuous HHI measure. The dummies
indicate whether the HHI lies in the bottom, medium, or top tercile of its empirical distribution.
We drop the BC dummy and one of the HHI dummies as a control variable to avoid perfect
multicollinearity. The results are similar to those in column [2]. While the BC laws have no
signiﬁcant eﬀect on ﬁrms in competitive industries (lowest HHI tercile), ﬁrms in less competi-
tive industries (medium and highest HHI terciles) experience a signiﬁcant drop in ROA of 0.8
percentage points and 1.2 percentage points, respectively.
Overall, our results are consistent with the notion that competition mitigates managerial
slack. While the opportunity for managerial slack increases equally across all industries, man-
agerial slack appears to increase only in non-competitive industries, but not in highly competitive
industries, where competitive pressure enforces discipline on management. Importantly, as our
results are based on changes in operating performance, they do not speak to the issue of what is
the level of managerial slack in competitive industries. In particular, they do not suggest that
competitive industries exhibit zero managerial slack. In fact, it is perfectly possible, and indeed
quite plausible, that there is some positive “baseline level” of slack in all industries. While ﬁrms
in competitive industries may naturally operate at this level, ﬁrms in non-competitive industries
may only operate at this minimum level if there is additionally a credible threat of a disciplinary
hostile takeover.
3.2. Reverse causality
While the inclusion of state- and industry-year controls alleviates concerns that the BC
laws are the outcome of lobbying at the local and industry level, respectively, it remains the
possibility that lobbying occurs at the state of incorporation level. Such lobbying is a concern
because it opens up the possibility of reverse causation. Precisely, if a broad coalition of ﬁrms
incorporated in the same state, which all experience a decline in proﬁtability and, moreover, all
12operate in non-competitive industries, successfully lobby for an anti-takeover law in their state
of incorporation, then causality might be reversed.
Given the anecdotal evidence in Romano (1987), who portrays lobbying for anti-takeover laws
as an exclusive political process, the notion of broad-based lobbying seems unlikely. Typically,
anti-takeover laws were adopted, often during emergency sessions, under the political pressure
of a single ﬁrm facing a takeover threat, not a broad coalition of ﬁrms. Hence, for all but a few
select ﬁr m s ,t h el a w sw e r el i k e l ye x o g e n o u s . 8 This notwithstanding, the possibility of reverse
causality deserves closer investigation. Following Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), we replace
the BC dummy in equation (2) with four dummies: BC Year(−1), BC Year(0), BC Year(1),
and BC Year(2+),w h e r eBC Year(−1) is a dummy that equals one if the ﬁrm is incorporated
in a state that will pass a BC law in one year from now, BC Year(0) is a dummy that equals
one if the ﬁrm is incorporated in a state that passes a BC law this year, and BC Year(1) and
BC Year(2+) are dummies that equal one if the ﬁrm is incorporated in a state that passed a BC
law one year ago and two or more years ago, respectively. If the BC laws were passed in response
to political pressure of a broad coalition of ﬁrms, which all experience a decline in proﬁtability
and, moreover, all operate in non-competitive industries, then we should see an “eﬀect” of the
laws already prior to their passage. In particular, if the coeﬃcient on BC Year(−1) × HHI
was negative and signiﬁcant, then this would be symptomatic of reverse causality.
As is shown in Panel (B) of Table 3,t h ec o e ﬃcient on BC Year(−1)×HHI is small and
insigniﬁcant, while the coeﬃcients on the other interaction terms are all large and signiﬁcant.
Thus, there appears to be no “eﬀect” of the BC laws prior to their passage, which is consistent
with a causal interpretation of our results. Moreover, and also consistent with a causal inter-
pretation of our results, the coeﬃcient on BC Year(0)×HHI is smaller than the coeﬃcient on
both BC Year(1) × HHI and BC Year(2+) × HHI.
3.3. Change in ﬁrms’ earnings management?
ROA is an accounting measure that can be manipulated. Accordingly, a drop in ROA after
the passage of the BC laws does not necessarily imply a reduction in operating proﬁtability. It
8Using newspaper reports (see Section 5), we have identiﬁed ﬁrms motivating the passage of the BC laws. For
example, the Minnesota BC law was adopted under the political pressure of the Dayton Hudson (now Target)
Corporation, when it was attacked by the Dart Group Corporation. Similar to other studies (e.g., Garvey and
Hanka, 1999), we ﬁnd that excluding such motivating ﬁr m sd o e sn o ta ﬀect our results.
13could simply reﬂect a change in the extent to which ﬁrms manage their earnings. For example,
ﬁrms might overstate their earnings to appear more proﬁtable in order to ward oﬀ hostile
takeovers. Consequently, ﬁrms’ earnings might drop after the laws’ passage not because of
a decrease in operating proﬁtability, but simply because the need for earnings overstatement
has been reduced. If additionally the threat of being taken over is primarily a concern for ﬁrms
in non-competitive industries, then this alternative story, based on changes in ﬁrms’ earnings
management, could potentially explain our results.
While it is diﬃcult to completely rule out this alternative story, we can oﬀer some pieces of
evidence that are inconsistent with it. First, the likelihood of being taken over is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent in competitive and non-competitive industries. In Table 6 below, which presents a
regression predicting the likelihood of being taken over, the HHI dummies as control variables are
all insigniﬁcant. (To avoid perfect multicollinearity, we have dropped one of the HHI dummies,
implying that the other two HHI dummies measure the takeover likelihood relative to ﬁrms in
the lowest HHI tercile.)
Second, we can examine whether the passage of the BC laws has a diﬀerent eﬀect on ROA
depending on whether the laws were passed early or late in the ﬁscal year. If a BC law is passed
only a few months prior to the ﬁscal year’s end, then it would seem hard to imagine that the
current year’s ROA should drop by much, given that most of the ﬁscal year is already over. In
this case, a signiﬁcant drop in ROA might be indicative of an earnings management story.
In Panel (A) of Table 4, we estimate a regression similar to that in Panel (B) of Table
3, except that the reference point is not the calender year in which the BC law was passed,
but the eﬀective month of the law’s passage, which is denoted by “0m”. Thus, the dummy
BC(0mt o6m) indicates that ROA is measured within six months after the law’s passage, the
dummy BC(6mt o12m) indicates that ROA is measured between six and twelve months after
the law’s passage, and so forth. For instance, the Delaware BC law was passed on February 8,
1988. A Delaware company whose ﬁscal year ends in June thus has its ﬁscal year end within
six months after the law’s passage. For this company, the dummy BC(0mt o6m) is set to one
in 1988. In contrast, a Delaware company whose ﬁscal year ends in December has its ﬁscal
year end between six and twelve months after the law’s passage. For this company, the dummy
BC(6mt o12m) is set to one in 1988.9 The main variable of interest is the interaction term
9Likewise, in 1987, the dummy BC(−12mt o − 6m) is set to one for the ﬁrst company, while the dummy
14BC(0mt o6m) × HHI, which captures the eﬀect of the BC laws on ﬁrms in non-competitive
industries when a law is passed late in the ﬁscal year. If the coeﬃcient on this interaction term
was signiﬁcant, then this might be indicative of an earnings management story. However, as
is shown, the coeﬃcient is small and insigniﬁcant. Moreover, the coeﬃcients on all subsequent
interaction terms are large and signiﬁcant, implying that it takes about six months until the
eﬀect of the BC laws shows up signiﬁcantly in the ROA number.
Third, we can directly measure whether ﬁrms’ earnings management has changed after the
laws’ passage. A commonly used proxy for earnings management are discretionary accruals,
which are those parts of total accruals over which management has discretion. Total accruals
are computed as the diﬀerence between earnings and operating cash ﬂows, or equivalently, as
the change between non-cash current assets minus the change in current liabilities, excluding the
portion that comes from the maturation of the ﬁrm’s long-term debt, minus depreciation and
amortization, scaled by total assets in the previous ﬁscal year. To identify those components of
total accruals that are discretionary, we follow Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995). The authors
show that a modiﬁed version of the Jones (1991) model has the most power in detecting earnings
management relative to other accrual-based models. The modiﬁed Jones model regresses total
accruals on the inverse of total assets in the previous ﬁscal year, the change in sales less the
change in accounts receivable, and property, plant and equipment. Discretionary accruals are
the residuals from this regression.
To test whether ﬁrms’ earnings management has changed after the passage of the BC laws,
we estimate our basic speciﬁcation using discretionary accruals as the dependent variable. The
results are presented in Panel (B) of Table 4. As is shown in column [1], the coeﬃcients on
BC and BC×HHI are both small and insigniﬁcant, suggesting that ﬁrms did not change their
earnings management after the laws’ passage. A related proxy for earnings management are dis-
cretionary current accruals, as used by Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998). The authors decompose
discretionary accruals into a short-term (or current) component and a long-term component
and argue that managers have more discretion over the short-term component. Discretionary
current accruals might thus be a less noisy proxy for earnings management. The results, which
are shown in column [2], are similar to those in column [1].
BC(−6mt o0m) is set to one for the second company. In contrast, in Panel (B) of Table 3, which is based on
calender years, the dummy BC Year(−1) is set to one for both companies in 1987, the dummy BC Year(0) is
set to one for both companies in 1988, and so forth.
15While it is hard to completely rule out that the drop in ROA is the result of a change in
earnings management, the evidence presented here is inconsistent with this hypothesis. Addi-
tional supporting evidence will be presented in Section 5, where we will show that BC laws not
only have an impact on accounting variables, but also on ﬁrms’ equity prices.
3.4. Change in ﬁrms’ asset mix?
An alternative story that is similar to the one above is that in which ﬁrms, rather than
overstating their earnings, invest in higher risk/higher return (but similar NPV) projects to
appear more proﬁtable in order to ward oﬀ hostile takeovers. As the ROA measure does not
adjust for risk, a drop in ROA after the passage of the BC laws does then not necessarily imply
a reduction in operating proﬁtability. It could simply reﬂect ﬁrms’ decisions to change their
asset mix towards lower risk/lower return projects, given that the threat of a hostile takeover
is now reduced. If additionally the threat of being taken over is primarily a concern for ﬁrms
in non-competitive industries, then this alternative story, based on changes in ﬁrms’ asset mix,
could potentially explain our results.
To test whether ﬁrms’ asset mix has become less risky after the passage of the BC laws,
we estimate our basic speciﬁcation using two diﬀerent measures of asset risk as the dependent
variable. The ﬁrst is cash-ﬂow volatility, as deﬁned in Zhang (2006), which captures both sys-
tematic and idiosyncratic asset risk. Cash-ﬂow volatility is computed as the standard deviation
of cash ﬂows from operations over the past ﬁve years, with a minimum of three years. The
second measure is the ﬁrm’s asset beta, which only captures systematic risk. As is common
practice, we compute the asset beta by multiplying the equity beta with one minus the ratio of
equity to total assets (e.g., Odders-White and Ready, 2006; Lewellen, 2006). The equity beta is
obtained by estimating the market model using ﬁve years of monthly stock returns from CRSP.
As is shown in Table 5, regardless of which measure of asset risk we use, the coeﬃcients on
BC and BC×HHI are both small and insigniﬁcant, suggesting that ﬁrms did not change their
asset mix after the passage of the BC laws.
While it is diﬃcult to deﬁnitely rule out that the drop in ROA is due to a change in ﬁrms’
asset mix, the evidence presented here is inconsistent with this idea. Additional supporting
evidence will be presented in Section 4, where we will show that ﬁrms did not change their R&D
activity, capital expenditures, and acquisition activity after the passage of the BC laws.
163.5. Did BC laws reduce the takeover threat?
A key assumption underlying our identiﬁcation strategy is that BC laws reduce the takeover
threat. This assumption may appear in conﬂict with evidence by Comment and Schwert (1995),
which suggests that anti-takeover laws did not signiﬁcantly lower the takeover likelihood.10
However, as Garvey and Hanka (1999) point out, as the takeover likelihood is an equilibrium
outcome, it is possible that anti-takeover laws are eﬀective, in the sense that they reduce the
takeover threat, yet the takeover likelihood remains unchanged. On the one hand, anti-takeover
laws increase the costs of mounting a hostile takeover. On the other hand, anti-takeover laws,
by reducing the takeover threat, may lead to an increase in managerial slack, which increases
the gains from mounting a hostile takeover. Since the two eﬀects go in opposite directions, it is
not clear what the overall eﬀect on subsequent takeover activity will be.
While this argument is appealing, it is unlikely to hold for the entire cross section. Given our
previous results, we would indeed expect that in non-competitive industries managerial slack
increases after the laws’ passage, implying that the overall eﬀect on the takeover likelihood is
potentially ambiguous. However, we would expect no signiﬁcant increase in slack in competitive
industries, implying that the takeover likelihood in these industries should decline. This latter
statement deserves clariﬁcation. If it were true that competitive industries leave zero room
for managerial slack, then we should not observe any disciplinary takeovers in these industries,
neither before nor after the passage of the BC laws, and thus also no change in the takeover
likelihood.11 However, as we argued in Section 3.1, our results do not suggest that competi-
tive industries exhibit zero managerial slack. In fact, it is perfectly possible, and indeed quite
10Contrary to his own previous ﬁndings, Schwert (2000) ﬁnds that hostile takeovers have become signiﬁcantly
less likely after 1989, which he partly attributes to the passage of anti-takeover laws: “This probably reﬂects
the eﬀects of [...] state antitakeover laws. In contrast, Comment and Schwert (1995) were unable to identify a
statistically signiﬁcant decline in hostile oﬀers based on an analysis of transactions through 1991”.
11BC laws only aﬀect disciplinary hostile takeovers. They do not impede friendly takeovers, where the target
ﬁrm’s directors can simply approve the business combination. For instance, the Delaware BC law, the most
signiﬁcant of its kind, stipulates that: “Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, a corporation shall
not engage in any business combination with any interested stockholder for a period of 3 years following the time
that such stockholder became an interested stockholder, unless: (1) Prior to such time the board of directors of
the corporation approved either the business combination or the transaction which resulted in the stockholder
becoming an interested stockholder [...]” (Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 203). By implication, any observed change in the
takeover frequency after the passage of the BC laws should exclusively come from disciplinary hostile takeovers.
17plausible, that there is some positive “baseline level” of slack in all industries, and thus also in
competitive industries. In that case, we should observe disciplinary takeovers also in competitive
industries, whose frequency we would then expect to decline, absent any oﬀsetting increase in
managerial slack, after the passage of the BC laws.
To investigate the eﬀect of the passage of the BC laws on the takeover likelihood, we follow
Shumway (2001) and estimate a multiperiod logit model where the dependent variable is a
dummy that equals one if the ﬁrm is acquired in the following year and zero otherwise. As
Shumway (Proposition 1) shows, this multiperiod logit model is equivalent to a discrete-time
hazard model and thus accounts for diﬀerences in the time to acquisition. Moreover, the model
entails ﬁrm-level dependence by construction, since a ﬁrm that has survived until time t cannot
have been acquired at time t−1. In the estimation, we not only account for ﬁrm-level dependence
but more generally for any arbitrary correlation within a state of incorporation by clustering
the logit standard errors at the state of incorporation level.
The takeover data are obtained from the Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) database.
Since these data begin in 1979, our sample period is reduced to 1978—1995 (with observed
takeovers from 1979—1996). We control for ﬁrm age by including age dummies. As Shumway
(2001, p. 112) notes, any function of age can be included in the model. Our results are similar
if we instead include the logarithm of age as a control variable, or if we do not control for age
at all. The other control variables are the same as in our basic regression. Importantly, we also
control for ﬁrm size, which, as Schwert (2000) argues, is the only variable that is consistently
signiﬁcant in empirical studies of the takeover likelihood.
The results are presented in Table 6. Column [1] shows the average eﬀect (i.e., across all
ﬁrms) of the passage of the BC laws on the takeover likelihood. While the coeﬃcient on the BC
dummy is negative, it is not signiﬁcant. Thus, consistent with Comment and Schwert’s (1995)
ﬁndings, BC laws do not signiﬁcantly reduce the takeover likelihood on average.I n c o l u m n
[2], we examine whether the laws’ passage has a diﬀerent eﬀect on the takeover likelihood in
competitive and non-competitive industries. We obtain two main results. First, the eﬀect is
monotonic in the HHI. Second, and consistent with our hypothesis, we ﬁnd that while the
passage of the BC laws signiﬁcantly reduces the takeover likelihood in competitive industries
(lowest HHI tercile), it has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the takeover likelihood in non-competitive
industries (medium and highest HHI terciles).
183.6. Robustness
3.6.1. Alternative competition measures
Our main competition measure is the HHI based on 3-digit SIC codes. In Table 7,w eu s e
HHIs based on 2-digit SIC codes (column [1]) and 4-digit SIC codes (column [2]), respectively.
As is shown, the results are similar to those in Table 3. The only diﬀerence is that the 2-
digit HHI as a control variable is not signiﬁcant, which is due to lack of suﬃcient “within”
variation of this variable. As for the economic magnitude of the “managerial-slack” eﬀect, an
increase in the 2-digit HHI by one standard deviation is associated with a drop in ROA of
−0.056 × 0.076 = −0.004, or 0.4 percentage points, which is close to the estimate in Table 3.
Likewise, an increase in the 4-digit HHI by one standard deviation is associated with a drop in
ROA of −0.022 × 0.190 = −0.004, or 0.4 percentage points.
In untabulated regressions, we use 2-digit, 3-digit, and 4-digit HHIs based on ﬁrms’ assets
in place of sales. The idea behind using asset-based HHIs is that sales can be rather volatile,
with the eﬀect that changes in the HHI may overstate actual changes in industry concentration
(Hou and Robinson, 2006). The results using asset-based HHIs are similar to those in Table
3. An alternative way to address the issue of sales volatility is to use smoothed HHI measures.
For instance, using a 3-year moving average HHI based on 3-digit SIC codes, we ﬁnd that the
interaction term between the BC dummy and the HHI has a coeﬃcient of −0.029 (t−statistic
of 3.94), which is similar to the estimate in Table 3.
In column [3], we consider a margin-based measure of competition, namely, the median
industry net proﬁt margin (NPM) based on 3-digit SIC Codes. At the ﬁrm level, NPM is
computed as operating income before depreciation and amortization (Compustat item #13)
divided by sales (item # 12). Industry NPM is commonly used in the industrial organization
literature as an empirical proxy for the Lerner index, which measures the extent to which ﬁrms
can set prices above marginal cost. Under the commonly made assumption that marginal cost
can be approximated by the average variable cost (Carlton and Perloﬀ, 1989, p. 367), the Lerner
index and industry NPM are equivalent. As is shown, the results are similar to our baseline
results in Table 3.
In Table 8, we consider competition measures that are only available for manufacturing
industries (SIC 2000-3999). In column [1], we use the Census HHI, which is based on all public
and private ﬁrms. While the Census HHI is broader than the HHI computed from Compustat, it
19has some limitations. First, the index is only available for the years 1982, 1987, and 1992 during
t h es a m p l ep e r i o d . T oﬁll in the missing years, we always use the index value from the latest
available year. For the years prior to 1982, we use the index value from 1982. Second, the index
is only available on the narrow 4-digit SIC code level, which implies that it is likely subject to
misclassiﬁcation. Third, the index is only available for manufacturing industries, which implies
that the sample is substantially smaller. And yet, the results are similar to those in Table 3.
As for the economic magnitude of the “managerial-slack” eﬀect, an increase in the Census HHI
by one standard deviation is associated with a drop in ROA of −0.081×0.046 = −0.004, or 0.4
percentage points, which is similar to the estimate in Table 3. Note that the HHI as a control
variable is omitted in column [1]. Except for three “jumps” in 1982, 1987, and 1992, this variable
has no “within” variation, implying that the coeﬃcient is not well identiﬁed.
Whether we use the Census HHI or the HHI computed from Compustat, we only capture
domestic competition. In column [2], we use import penetration as our competition measure.
Like the Census HHI, this measure is only available for manufacturing industries, and only on
the narrow 4-digit SIC code level, which implies that it is likely subject to misclassiﬁcation.
Moreover, it is not clear that import penetration is a suitable measure of competition. For
instance, import penetration may be high, yet an industry may be non-competitive because all
of the imports come from a single foreign producer. Likewise, import penetration may be low, yet
an industry may be highly competitive because domestic competition is ﬁerce. In fact, import
penetration may be low because domestic competition is ﬁerce. While the results are similar to
those in Table 3, they are slightly weaker. This may be partly due to the smaller sample size,
but it may also be due to the fact that import penetration is a poor measure of competition.
Perhaps the most meaningful way to use import penetration is together with the Census HHI,
as is done in column [3]. In this regression, the BC dummy measures the (limit) eﬀect of the
BC laws on industries with both high domestic competition and high import penetration. As is
shown, the results are similar to those in column [1].
3.6.2. Miscellaneous robustness checks
This section presents additional robustness checks. For brevity’s sake, the results are not
tabulated. In many cases, tabulated results as well as discussions can be found in an earlier
working paper version (Giroud and Mueller, 2008a). All of the results discussed below are
available from the authors upon request.
20“Horse races”. Our results could be spurious if they were not driven by the HHI but
by some (omitted) variable Z for which the HHI is merely proxying. We address this issue
by running “horse races” between the HHI and various candidates for Z, including size, age,
leverage, ROA, Tobin’s Q, G-Index, E-index, and poison pills. To mitigate endogeneity concerns,
we use lagged values and industry averages. In each case, we estimate our basic speciﬁcation
with two additional terms: an interaction term BC × Z and a control term Z. The results are
consistently similar to those in Table 3. In particular, the coeﬃcient on the interaction term
between the BC dummy and the HHI is remarkably stable with values ranging from −0.026
to −0.032 (t−statistics from 3.02 to 4.09). To estimate the limit eﬀect of the BC laws as the
HHI goes to zero, we sum up the coeﬃcient on the BC dummy and the coeﬃcient on BC × Z
multiplied by ¯ Z, where ¯ Z i st h es a m p l em e a no fZ. Whether this expression is signiﬁcant can
be tested using a standard F−test. Consistent with our results in Table 3, we ﬁnd that the
estimate is always close to zero (values from 0.001 to 0.003)w h i l et h ep−v a l u ei sa l w a y sl a r g e
(values from 0.374 to 0.959).
Lagged HHIs and average HHI from 1976 to 1984. As discussed above, the positive
coeﬃcient on the HHI as a control variable mitigates potential endogeneity concerns related to
the HHI. To further address this issue, we estimate our basic speciﬁcation using lagged values of
the HHI (up to ﬁve years) as well as the average HHI from 1976 to 1984 (the ﬁrst BC law was
passed in 1985). In each case, the results are similar to those in Table 3. For instance, using the
average HHI from 1976 to 1984, we ﬁnd that the BC dummy is close to zero and insigniﬁcant,
while the interaction term between the BC dummy and the HHI has a coeﬃcient of −0.028
(t−statistic of 4.82).
Non-Delaware and “Eventually BC” samples. About one half of the ﬁrms in our
sample are incorporated in Delaware. Thus, one might be worried that our results are driven by
a single BC law. When we exclude Delaware ﬁrms from the treatment group, we ﬁnd that the
BC dummy is again close to zero and insigniﬁcant, while the interaction term between the BC
dummy and the HHI has a coeﬃcient of −0.032 (t−statistic of 2.41), which is almost identical to
the estimate in Table 3.12 Another potential concern is that the control and treatment groups
might diﬀer for reasons unrelated to the passage of the BC laws. To address this issue, we
12The weaker signiﬁcance is likely due to the fact that, by exluding Delaware ﬁrms, we lose about 58% of the
treatment group, which substantially reduces the number of observations available for identifying the coeﬃcient.
21restrict the control group to ﬁrms incorporated in treatment states that have not yet passed a
BC law. The results are again similar to those in Table 3. While the BC dummy is close to zero
and insigniﬁcant, the interaction term between the BC dummy and the HHI has a coeﬃcient of
−0.032 (t−statistic of 4.74).
Alternative performance measures. Our main performance measure is ROA before
depreciation. In robustness checks, we use a variety of alternative performance measures: ROA
after depreciation, which is deﬁned as operating income after depreciation and amortization
(Compustat item # 178) divided by total assets (item #6), net proﬁt margin (NPM), which is
deﬁned as operating income before depreciation and amortization (item #13) divided by sales
(item #12), and return on equity (ROE), which is deﬁned as net income (item #172) divided
by common equity (item #60). Arguably, ROA is the most suited of these measures. NPM is
based on ﬁrms’ sales, which can be rather volatile, while ROE depends on leverage. Regardless
of which performance measure we use, however, we obtain results that are similar to those in
Table 3. While the BC dummy is always close to zero and insigniﬁcant, the interaction term
between the BC dummy and the HHI is always negative and signiﬁcant, with coeﬃcients ranging
from −0.031 to −0.035 (t−statistics from 2.74 to 4.73).
Diﬀerent sample periods. Our sample period is from 1976 to 1995, which is the same
period as in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003). It has been questioned whether the BC laws
had any signiﬁcant eﬀect prior to June 1989, when an appellate court upheld Wisconsin’s BC
law in Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp.13 To address this issue, we estimate
our basic speciﬁcation for the truncated period from 1976 to 1988. The results are again similar
to our results in Table 3. While the BC dummy is close to zero and insigniﬁcant, the interaction
term between the BC dummy and the HHI has a coeﬃcient of −0.029 (t−statistic of 4.35). A
possible explanation for why the results are similar is that ﬁrms may have always believed that
the BC laws would be enforced, so they acted accordingly. This conviction may in part stem
from earlier rulings on other types of anti-takeover laws, such as the decision in 1987 by the
U.S. Supreme Court to uphold Indiana’s control share acquisition law (CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of America).
13Already in 1988, the Delaware BC law was held to be constitutional in RP Acquisition Corp. v. Staley
Continental, Inc. The Wisconsin ruling in 1989 is viewed as a landmark decision, though, because the Wisconsin
law was more stringent than the Delaware law, and because it was upheld by a federal appellate court and ended
up with the U.S. Supreme Court, which sustained the decision of the appellate court.
22In other robustness checks, we impose a symmetry condition by using a sample period that
begins n years before the ﬁrst BC was passed and ends n years after the last BC law was passed.
The sample period is thus from 1985−n to 1991+n, where n =4 ,5,6, and 7. In each case, the
results are similar to our baseline results in Table 3.
Entry and exit of ﬁrms. An alternative explanation for our results is that the passage of
the BC laws caused a drop in proﬁts for all ﬁrms, but in competitive industries those ﬁrms who
experienced a drop in proﬁts went bankrupt and exited the sample. In that case, our results
could be driven by survivorship bias. To purge the sample of entry and exit eﬀects, we restrict
the sample to only those ﬁrms that were present during the entire period from 1981 to 1995,
which is the period four years before the ﬁrst BC law until four years after the last BC law.
The results are again similar to our results in Table 3. While the BC dummy is close to zero
and insigniﬁcant, the interaction term between the BC dummy and the HHI has a coeﬃcient
of −0.027 (t−statistic of 2.19), where the weaker signiﬁcance is likely due to the fact that the
sample size is reduced by 63%.
Accounting for ROA outliers. Since ROA is a ratio, it can take on extreme values if
the scaling variable (total assets) becomes too small, feeding concerns that our results could
be driven by ROA outliers. In our basic speciﬁcation, we trim 1% at each tail of the ROA
distribution. Our results are qualitatively similar if we trim 5% or 10% at each tail, if we use
log(1+ROA) as the dependent variable, if we exclude ﬁrms with assets below $1 million, if we
estimate a median regression (with industry ﬁxed eﬀects), and if we estimate a Poisson regression
in which ROA is converted into a count variable ranging from 1 to 10. In the case of the median
and Poisson regressions, standard errors are computed using block bootstrapping with 51 blocks
based on 200 bootstrap samples.
Heterogeneous time trends and state eﬀects. To allow for heterogeneous time trends
and state eﬀects, we interact all covariates with time dummies and treatment-state dummies.
The results are again similar to those in Table 3.
Cross-sectional and serial correlation of the error terms. Cross-sectional correlation
is a concern because all ﬁrms in a given year and state of incorporation are aﬀected by the same
“shock,” namely, the passage of the BC law (Moulton, 1990). Serial correlation is a concern
because the BC dummy changes little over time, being zero before and one after the passage of
the BC law (Bertrand, Duﬂo, and Mullainathan, 2004). Given that the BC dummy is a likely
23source of both cross-sectional and serial correlation, we cluster standard errors at the state of
incorporation level in all our regressions.
In addition to clustering, we consider a number of alternative correction methods. The
methods are all described in Bertrand, Duﬂo, and Mullainathan (2004), which is why we shall
be brief here. For instance, we obtain similar results if we use an AR(1) correction method, or
if we (block) bootstrap the standard errors using 51 blocks with 200 bootstrap samples. We
also obtain similar results if we collapse the data into two periods, before and after the BC
law, which is a crude, albeit eﬀective, way to deal with the issue of serial correlation. Since
“before” and “after” are diﬀerent for each treatment state (while for control states “before” and
“after” are not even well deﬁned), the estimation proceeds in two steps. In the ﬁrst step, we
regress ROA on ﬁxed eﬀects and covariates, except for the BC dummy and the interaction term
between the BC dummy and the HHI. For treatment states only, we then collect the residuals
and compute the average residuals for the pre- and post-BC law periods. This provides us with
a two-period panel, where the ﬁrst period is before the law and the second period is after the
law. In the second step, we regress the average residuals on the BC dummy and the interaction
term between the BC dummy and the average post-BC HHI. We use robust standard errors
to correct for heteroskedasticity. We also obtain similar results if we use a similar two-step
procedure to deal with the issue of cross-sectional correlation. Speciﬁcally, we collapse the data
into state of incorporation-industry-year cells, based on the notion that our main variables of
interest, namely, the BC dummy and the HHI, are both at a higher level of aggregation.
4. Empire building or quiet life?
While our results suggest that competition mitigates managerial agency problems, they do
not say which agency problem is being mitigated. Does competition curb managerial empire
building? Or does it prevent managers from enjoying a “quiet life” by forcing them to undertake
“cognitively diﬃcult activities” (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003)? In Table 9, we attempt
to distinguish between these two hypotheses. For brevity’s sake, we only report the coeﬃcients
on the BC dummy and the interaction term between the BC dummy and the HHI, which are
our main variables of interest.
In Panel (A), we estimate our basic speciﬁcation using various proxies for empire building
as the dependent variable. In column [1], we use capital expenditures (Compustat item #30)
divided by total assets (item #6). Arguably, capital expenditures are a poor proxy for empire
24building if most of the activity comes in the form of acquisitions. We address this issue by using
total asset growth and PPE growth in columns [2] and [3], respectively. Total asset growth is
the percentage increase in total assets, while PPE growth is the percentage increase in property,
plant, and equipment (item #8). We also construct more direct proxies for acquisition activity
using data from the Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) database. Since the SDC data begin
in 1979, the sample period is from 1979 to 1995. In column [4], the dependent variable is the
sum of the value of all acquisitions made by a ﬁrm in a given year divided by the ﬁrm’s average
market capitalization in that year (“acquisition ratio”). In column [5], the dependent variable
is the likelihood of being an acquirer, measured by a dummy variable that equals one if the ﬁrm
makes at least one acquisition during the year and zero otherwise. As is shown, regardless of
which proxy we use, neither the BC dummy nor the interaction term between the BC dummy
and the HHI are signiﬁcant, neither individually nor jointly.
In Panel (B), we estimate our basic speciﬁcation using various proxies for “quiet life” as
the dependent variable. In column [1], we use selling, general, and administrative expenses
(“overhead costs,” item #189) divided by total assets. In column [2], we use advertising expenses
(item #45) divided by sales (item #12). In column [3], we use R&D expenses (item #46) divided
by total assets. In column [4], we use costs of goods sold (“input costs,” item #41) divided by
sales. In column [5], we use real wages, which are computed as the natural logarithm of labor
and related expenses (item #42) divided by the number of employees (item #29) and deﬂated
by the consumer price index from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. As is shown, the BC
dummy is always close to zero and insigniﬁcant. In columns [2] and [3], the interaction term
between the BC dummy and the HHI has the right sign but is insigniﬁcant. Importantly,
however, in columns [1], [4], and [5], the interaction term is positive and signiﬁcant, implying
that overhead costs, input costs, and real wages all increase after the passage of the BC laws,
and only so in non-competitive industries. These results are consistent with a “quiet life”
hypothesis, whereby managers insulated from both hostile takeovers and competitive pressure
seek to avoid cognitively diﬃcult activities, such as haggling with input suppliers, labor unions,
and organizational units within the company demanding bigger overhead budgets.
Let us conclude with two caveats. First, the interaction terms in Panel (B) have smaller
t−statistics than in our regression in Table 3, presumably because the dependent variables
are all individual components of ROA. Thus, while the passage of the BC laws has a large and
25signiﬁcant eﬀect on ROA overall, it has only a relatively small eﬀect on any individual component
of ROA. Second, the wage result in Panel (B) should be taken with caution. Not only is the
sample quite small, as only few ﬁrms in Compustat report wage data, but the data are also very
noisy (see Bertrand and Mullainathan, 1999). For instance, some ﬁrms report wage data only
intermittently, while others report no wage data at all. What is more, Compustat only provides
aggregate data on labor and related expenses, which also includes pension costs, payroll taxes,
and employee beneﬁts. On a positive note, our wage results are similar to those in Bertrand and
Mullainathan (1999, 2003), who report wage increases between 1% and 2% after the passage of
the BC laws. (In our case, the average wage increase is 1.9%.)
5. Event-study results
Does the stock market anticipate that ﬁrms in competitive industries are largely unaﬀected
by the passage of the BC laws? The main diﬃculty in answering this question lies in the choice
of event date. Since the passage date itself is well anticipated, it is unlikely to contain much
new information. Instead, one must ﬁn da ne a r l yd a t ea tw h i c hs i g n i ﬁcant news about the
law is disseminated to the public, e.g., the date of the ﬁrst newspaper report about the law.
For instance, Karpoﬀ and Malatesta (1989), in their event study of anti-takeover laws, ﬁnd no
signiﬁcant abnormal returns when using either the date of the law’s introduction in the state
legislature, its ﬁnal passage, or its signing by the governor as the event date. However, they do
ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant abnormal returns when using the ﬁrst date for which they could ﬁnd
a newspaper report about the law as the event date.
Finding the ﬁrst newspaper report about a BC law is often a formidable task. Electronic
archives of local newspapers often do not go back to the 1980s, while large out-of-state news-
papers, such as the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times, often provide no coverage,
especially if the state in question is small and only few ﬁrms are incorporated in it. After a care-
ful search of major newspaper databases (ProQuest, Lexis-Nexis, Factiva, Newsbank America’s
Newspapers, Google News Archive), we could ﬁnd newspaper reports for 19 of the 30 BC laws
in our sample: Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. Most of the remaining 11 states are small in
terms of the number of incorporated ﬁrms. In fact, seven of them had fewer than 20 ﬁrms–and
only one (Nevada) had more than 100 ﬁrms–in the merged CRSP-Compustat sample in the
26year in which the BC law was passed. The 19 states for which we could ﬁnd newspaper reports
represent 92% of all ﬁrms incorporated in states that passed a BC law during the sample period.
The event-study methodology is based on the assumption that the events are independent
(MacKinlay, 1997). While this assumption is satisﬁed in many applications, it is not satisﬁed
in our case. Since all ﬁr m si n c o r p o r a t e di nag i v e ns t a t ea r ea ﬀected by the same event, their
abnormal returns are likely correlated, leading to biased standard errors. A common way to
address this problem is to form portfolios consisting of all ﬁr m si n c o r p o r a t e di nag i v e ns t a t e .
Since the event dates are diﬀerent for each state portfolio, the issue of cross-sectional correlation
then becomes negligible (MacKinlay, 1997; Karpoﬀ and Malatesta, 1989).
Our empirical methodology follows Karpoﬀ and Malatesta (1989). For each state portfolio j,
we estimate the market model using CRSP daily return data from 241 to 41 trading days prior
to the event date.14 That is, we estimate
Rjt = αj + βjRmt + ejt, (3)
where Rjt is the daily return of the equally-weighted portfolio of all ﬁrms incorporated in state j,
and where Rmt is the daily return of the equally-weighted CRSP market portfolio. Substituting
the estimates back into (3), we obtain an estimate of the normal portfolio return ˆ Rjt.T h e
abnormal return of state portfolio j can then be computed as
ARjt := Rjt − ˆ Rjt. (4)
To obtain cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), we simply sum up the abnormal returns over
the desired time interval. We report average CARs based on the 19 state portfolios for the same
time intervals as Karpoﬀ and Malatesta (1989): [-40,-2], [-3,-2], [-1,0], [1,2], and [1,10], where
[-1,0] is the two-day event window. To see if there is any systematic trend prior to the event
date, we additionally report average CARs for the time intervals [-30,-2], [-20,-2], and [-10,-2].
The above methodology yields an estimate of the average impact of the BC laws on stock
prices. To examine if the price impact is diﬀerent for ﬁrms in competitive and non-competitive
industries, we divide each state portfolio into equal-sized smaller portfolios. For each state j,
14Choosing the estimation window adjacent to the ﬁrst time interval for which cumulative abnormal returns
are computed (here: the time interval [-40,-2]) is common practice (MacKinlay, 1997). However, we obtain similar
results if we instead estimate the market model for the time interval from 300 to 100 trading days prior to the
event date. We also obtain similar results if we use either a 3- or 4-factor model instead of the market model.
27we form a low- and high-HHI portfolio by sorting ﬁrms based on whether their HHI lies below
or above the median, respectively. We also do the same with low-, medium-, and high-HHI
portfolios by sorting ﬁrms based on whether their HHI lies in the lowest, medium, and highest
tercile, respectively. The remaining steps are the same as above.
The results are shown in Panel (A) of Table 10. A si ss h o w ni nc o l u m n[ 1 ] ,t h ea v e r a g e
CAR in the two-day event window is −0.32% (z−statistic of −2.58). Moreover, 14 of the 19
individual CARs are negative. Of equal interest is that the average two-day CARs immediately
before and after the two-day event window are small and insigniﬁcant.
Columns [2] and [3] show the average CARs for the low- and high-HHI portfolios. The average
two-day event CAR for the low-HHI portfolio is small and insigniﬁcant, while the average two-
day event CAR for the high-HHI portfolio is −0.54% (z−statistic of −2.36). Thus, while ﬁrms
in competitive industries experience no signiﬁcant stock price impact around the date of the ﬁrst
newspaper report about the BC law, ﬁrms in non-competitive industries experience a signiﬁcant
abnormal stock price decline.
Columns [4] to [6] show the average CARs for the low-, medium-, and high-HHI portfolios.
The results are again similar. While ﬁrms in competitive industries experience no signiﬁcant
stock price impact, ﬁrms in less competitive industries experience a signiﬁcant abnormal stock
price decline. Moreover, and consistent with the results in column [3] of Table 3, the stock price
decline is monotonic in the HHI. While the average two-day event CAR for the low-HHI portfolio
is small and insigniﬁcant, the average two-day event CARs for the medium- and high-HHI
portfolios are −0.44% (z−statistic of −1.67)a n d−0.67% (z−statistic of −2.31), respectively.15
In Panel (B), we test whether the average two-day event CARs are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
between HHI groups. For each state j, we form a hedge portfolio that is long in the top-
HHI group and short in the bottom-HHI group, where “top” and “bottom” are deﬁn e db yt h e
respective HHI partition. Average CARs and z−statistics are computed based on the 19 hedge
portfolios. In column [1], we form a hedge portfolio that is long in the above-median HHI group
and short in the below-median HHI group. As is shown, the average CARs of the two groups
are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other (z−statistic of 1.41). This is not surprising. As
is often the case with stock returns, signiﬁcant diﬀerences can only be found between extreme
15We obtain a similar monotonic pattern using median CARs. The median two-day event CAR for the low-,
medium-, and high-HHI portfolio is 0.06%, −0.46%, and −0.67%, respectively. The corresponding ratio of positive
to negative CARs in the two-day event window is 10:9, 4:15, and 5:14, respectively.
28portfolios. In column [2], we form a hedge portfolio that is long in the top-tercile HHI group and
short in the bottom-tercile HHI group. As is shown, the diﬀerence between the two groups now
becomes marginally signiﬁcant (z−statistic of 1.76). If we consider even ﬁner HHI partitions,
this diﬀerence becomes even more pronounced. In columns [3] and [4], we form hedge portfolios
that are based on HHI quartiles and quintiles, respectively. In both cases, the diﬀerence between
the bottom- and top-HHI group is now signiﬁcant at the 5% level (z−statistics of 2.02 and 2.06,
respectively).
Let us conclude with a word of caution. To a certain extent, the event-study evidence
alleviates concerns that our main results are obtained using accounting variables, which can be
manipulated (see Section 3.3). That said, it does not convey deﬁnitive evidence that ﬁrms in
non-competitive industries experience a larger drop in proﬁtability. It could be the case that,
for a variety of reasons, the value gains from (hostile) takeovers are higher in non-competitive
industries, in which case the larger stock price decline in these industries might merely reﬂect
the capitalized value of higher forgone value gains.
6. Conclusion
Using the passage of business combination (BC) laws as a source of exogenous variation,
we examine if these laws have a diﬀerent eﬀect on ﬁrms in competitive and non-competitive
industries. While ﬁrms in non-competitive industries experience a signiﬁcant drop in operating
performance after the laws’ passage, ﬁrms in competitive industries experience virtually no
eﬀect, which is consistent with the notion that competition mitigates managerial slack. When
we examine which agency problem competition mitigates, we ﬁnd evidence in support of a “quiet
life” hypothesis. Input costs, wages, and overhead costs all increase after the laws’ passage,
and only so in non-competitive industries. We obtain a similar picture when conducting event
studies around the dates of the ﬁrst newspaper reports about the BC laws. While ﬁrms in non-
competitive industries experience a signiﬁcant stock price decline, ﬁrms in competitive industries
experience a small and insigniﬁcant stock price impact.
Our results have implications both for policy and research. For instance, our results suggest
that policy eﬀorts to improve corporate governance could beneﬁt from focusing primarily on
ﬁrms in non-competitive industries. Moreover, such eﬀorts could be broadened to also include
measures aimed at improving an industry’s competitiveness, such as deregulation and antitrust
laws. Our results also suggest that researchers who want to study the eﬀects of governance
29could beneﬁt from interacting governance proxies with measures of competition. The empirical
relationship might be stronger, both economically and statistically, for ﬁrms in non-competitive
industries. To give an example, preliminary ﬁndings by the authors suggest that the positive
alpha generated by the governance hedge portfolio in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) comes
entirely from non-competitive industries (Giroud and Mueller, 2008b). In contrast, the alpha
in competitive industries is small and insigniﬁcant. Hence, good governance at the ﬁrm level
is associated with higher equity prices in non-competitive industries, but not in competitive
industries. While these preliminary ﬁndings are encouraging, more research is needed before we
can conclude that ﬁrm-level governance instruments are moot in competitive industries.
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33Table 1 
States of Incorporation and States of Location 
 
“BC year” indicates the year in which a business combination (BC) law was passed. “State of location” indicates the state in which a 
firm’s headquarters are located. BC years are from Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003). States of location and states of incorporation 
are both from Compustat. The sample period is from 1976 to 1995. 
 
Delaware 1988 5,587 39 35 (89.7%) 4 (10.3%)
California 529 1,711 489 (28.6%) 1,034 (60.4%) 188 (11.0%)
New York 1985 515 1,129 366 (32.4%) 673 (59.6%) 90 (8.0%)
Nevada 1991 302 97 55 (56.7%) 28 (28.9%) 14 (14.4%)
Florida 290 584 240 (41.1%) 261 (44.7%) 83 (14.2%)
Minnesota 1987 287 342 243 (71.1%) 88 (25.7%) 11 (3.2%)
Massachusetts 1989 280 527 236 (44.8%) 253 (48.0%) 38 (7.2%)
Colorado 266 363 160 (44.1%) 147 (40.5%) 56 (15.4%)
Pennsylvania 1989 264 428 219 (51.2%) 169 (39.5%) 40 (9.3%)
Texas 263 951 240 (25.2%) 555 (58.4%) 156 (16.4%)
New Jersey 1986 255 585 194 (33.2%) 305 (52.1%) 86 (14.7%)
Ohio 1990 224 375 198 (52.8%) 151 (40.3%) 26 (6.9%)
Maryland 1989 197 200 82 (41.0%) 103 (51.5%) 15 (7.5%)
Georgia 1988 142 277 123 (44.4%) 121 (43.7%) 33 (11.9%)
Virginia 1988 137 243 106 (43.6%) 103 (42.4%) 34 (14.0%)
Michigan 1989 120 209 109 (52.2%) 81 (38.8%) 19 (9.1%)
Indiana 1986 119 144 97 (67.4%) 41 (28.5%) 6 (4.2%)
Utah 111 97 60 (61.9%) 29 (29.9%) 8 (8.2%)
Washington 1987 102 149 87 (58.4%) 44 (29.5%) 18 (12.1%)
Wisconsin 1987 94 124 86 (69.4%) 34 (27.4%) 4 (3.2%)
North Carolina 92 173 85 (49.1%) 66 (38.2%) 22 (12.7%)
Missouri 1986 80 169 60 (35.5%) 92 (54.4%) 17 (10.1%)
Oregon 69 89 61 (68.5%) 15 (16.9%) 13 (14.6%)
Tennessee 1988 67 134 59 (44.0%) 54 (40.3%) 21 (15.7%)
Oklahoma 1991 58 121 45 (37.2%) 58 (47.9%) 18 (14.9%)
Illinois 1989 57 444 47 (10.6%) 353 (79.5%) 44 (9.9%)
Connecticut 1989 56 307 48 (15.6%) 209 (68.1%) 50 (16.3%)
Arizona 1987 39 152 35 (23.0%) 76 (50.0%) 41 (27.0%)
Iowa 38 67 31 (46.3%) 27 (40.3%) 9 (13.4%)
Louisiana 35 67 30 (44.8%) 30 (44.8%) 7 (10.4%)
South Carolina 1988 35 77 34 (44.2%) 37 (48.1%) 6 (7.8%)
Kansas 1989 34 70 26 (37.1%) 33 (47.1%) 11 (15.7%)
Kentucky 1987 29 67 28 (41.8%) 31 (46.3%) 8 (11.9%)
Rhode Island 1990 18 37 14 (37.8%) 18 (48.6%) 5 (13.5%)
Wyoming 1989 18 13 7 (53.8%) 1 (7.7%) 5 (38.5%)
Mississippi 16 47 15 (31.9%) 21 (44.7%) 11 (23.4%)
New Mexico 15 26 9 (34.6%) 10 (38.5%) 7 (26.9%)
Maine 1988 13 14 5 (35.7%) 8 (57.1%) 1 (7.1%)
New Hampshire 13 47 11 (23.4%) 28 (59.6%) 8 (17.0%)
Hawaii 12 20 8 (40.0%) 9 (45.0%) 3 (15.0%)
Alabama 10 67 9 (13.4%) 54 (80.6%) 4 (6.0%)
District of Columbia 10 30 4 (13.3%) 22 (73.3%) 4 (13.3%)
Idaho 1988 10 16 2 (12.5%) 11 (68.8%) 3 (18.8%)
Arkansas 9 35 9 (25.7%) 20 (57.1%) 6 (17.1%)
Nebraska 1988 9 29 8 (27.6%) 18 (62.1%) 3 (10.3%)
West Virginia 8 19 7 (36.8%) 9 (47.4%) 3 (15.8%)
Montana 7 13 7 (53.8%) 4 (30.8%) 2 (15.4%)
Vermont 7 16 6 (37.5%) 9 (56.3%) 1 (6.3%)
Alaska 6 6 4 (66.7%) 2 (33.3%) 0 (0.0%)
South Dakota 1990 4 10 4 (40.0%) 5 (50.0%) 1 (10.0%)
North Dakota 2 4 1 (25.0%) 2 (50.0%) 1 (25.0%)
Total 10,960 10,960 4,144 (37.8%) 5,552 (50.7%) 1,264 (11.5%)
State of    
Location
Number of    
Firms
Number (Percentage) of Firms Incorporated in:
State BC Year
State of Location Delaware Other States
State of 
Incorporation
Number of  
Firms
 
 Table 2 
Summary Statistics 
 
In Panel (A), return on assets (ROA) is operating income before depreciation and amortization (Compustat item #13) divided by total 
assets (item #6). In Panel (B), “All States” refers to all states in Table 1. “Eventually BC” refers to all states that passed a BC law 
during the sample period. “Never BC” refers to all states that never passed a BC law during the sample period. Size is the natural 
logarithm of total assets. Age is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of years the firm has been in Compustat. HHI is the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index, which is computed as the sum of squared market shares of all firms in a given 3-digit SIC industry. 
Market shares are computed from Compustat based on firms’ sales (item #12). All figures in Panel (B) are sample means. Standard 
deviations are in parentheses. The sample period is from 1976 to 1995. 
 
 
Panel (A): ROA (Trimmed at 1% Level)
Mean Median Minimum Maximum





Panel (B): "Eventually BC" States vs. "Never BC" States
[1] [2] [3]
All States Eventually BC Never BC
Size 4.450 4.585 3.629
(2.283) (2.270) (2.185)
Age 2.252 2.293 2.002
(0.918) (0.924) (0.837)




 Table 3 
Does Corporate Governance Matter in Competitive Industries? 
 
BC is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is incorporated in a state that has passed a BC law. HHI(Low), HHI(Medium), 
and HHI(High) are dummy variables that equal one if the HHI lies in the bottom, medium, and top tercile, respectively, of its empiri-
cal distribution. “Industry-year” and “state-year” are variables that indicate the mean of the dependent variable in the firm’s industry 
and state of location, respectively, excluding the firm itself. BC Year(-1) is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is incorpo-
rated in a state that will pass a BC law in one year from now. BC Year(0) is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is incorpo-
rated in a state that passes a BC law this year. BC Year(1) and BC Year(2+) are dummy variables that equal one if the firm is incor-
porated in a state that passed a BC law one year and two or more years ago, respectively. All other variables are defined in Table 2. 
The coefficients are estimated using OLS. Standard errors are clustered at the state of incorporation level. The sample period is from 
1976 to 1995. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel (A): Main Results Panel (B): Reverse Causality
[1] [2] [3]
Dependent Variable: ROA ROA ROA Dependent Variable: ROA
BC -0.006** 0.001 BC Year(-1) -0.001
(2.25) (0.35) (0.17)
BC x HHI -0.033*** BC Year(0) -0.002
(4.95) (0.39)
BC x HHI(Low) 0.002 BC Year(1) -0.000
(0.68) (0.07)
BC x HHI(Medium) -0.008** BC Year(2+) 0.004
(2.56) (0.74)
BC x HHI(High) -0.012*** BC Year(-1) x HHI 0.001
(4.59) (0.07)
Industry-year 0.206*** 0.206*** 0.206*** BC Year(0) x HHI -0.027**
(9.67) (9.60) (9.61) (2.06)
State-year 0.249*** 0.249*** 0.248*** BC Year(1) x HHI -0.032***
(8.86) (8.83) (8.77) (4.33)
Size 0.096*** 0.097*** 0.097*** BC Year(2+) x HHI -0.034***
(20.27) (20.38) (20.34) (4.15)
Size-squared -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** Industry-year 0.210***
(20.09) (20.42) (20.53) (7.70)
Age -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.021*** State-year 0.256***
(5.34) (5.44) (5.37) (7.74)
HHI 0.015* 0.025*** Size 0.097***
(1.66) (2.58) (20.37)
HHI(Medium) 0.006* Size-squared -0.007***
(1.88) (20.44)
HHI(High) 0.008** Age -0.020***
(2.12) (5.44)
HHI 0.025**
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes (2.53)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes
Observations 77,460 77,460 77,460 Year Fixed Effects Yes
Adj. R-squared 0.68 0.68 0.68
Adj. R-squared 0.68
Observations 77,460
 Table 4 
Change in Firms' Earnings Management? 
 
BC(-12m to -6m) is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is incorporated in a BC state and the firm’s fiscal year end lies 
between 12 months and 6 months prior to the month of the law’s passage. BC(-6m to 0m), BC(0m to 6m), BC(6m to 12m), and 
BC(12m +) are defined analogously. Discretionary accruals are computed as in Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995). Discretionary 
current accruals are computed as in Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998). All other variables are defined in Tables 2 and 3. The coeffi-
cients are estimated using OLS. Standard errors are clustered at the state of incorporation level. The sample period is from 1976 to 
1995. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 




BC(-12m to -6m) -0.001 BC -0.000 0.000
(0.23) (0.12) (0.15)
BC(-6m to 0m) 0.002 BC x HHI -0.001 -0.003
(0.51) (0.28) (0.39)
BC(0m to 6m) -0.003 Industry-year 0.375*** 0.403***
(0.70) (13.97) (21.94)
BC(6m to 12m) 0.000 State-year 0.007 0.054**
(0.04) (0.99) (2.52)
BC(12m +) 0.003 Size -0.012*** -0.016***
(0.79) (5.50) (10.65)
BC(-12m to -6m) x HHI 0.001 Size-squared 0.000 0.001***
(0.08) (1.40) (4.86)
BC(-6m to 0m) x HHI -0.006 Age -0.038*** -0.030***
(0.39) (17.33) (13.90)
BC(0m to 6m) x HHI -0.019 HHI -0.004 -0.004
(0.81) (0.55) (0.76)
BC(6m to 12m) x HHI -0.031***
(2.62) Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes
BC(12m +) x HHI -0.036** Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
(4.45)
Industry-year 0.207*** Observations 63,749 64,070










Firm Fixed Effects Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes
Observations 77,460
Adj. R-squared 0.68
Dependent Variable: Dependent Variable: ROA
State-year 0.250***
 Table 5 
Change in Firms' Asset Mix? 
 
Cash-flow volatility is computed as in Zhang (2006). The asset beta is computed as the equity beta times the market value of equity 
(Compustat item #24 times item #25) divided by the market value of assets (item #24 times item #25 – item #60 + item #6). The 
equity beta is obtained by estimating the market model over the previous five years using monthly return data from CRSP. All other 
variables are defined in Tables 2 and 3. The coefficients are estimated using OLS. Standard errors are clustered at the state of incor-
poration level. The sample period is from 1976 to 1995. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 





















Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 54,460 75,831
Adj. R-squared 0.63 0.46
Dependent Variable:Table 6 
Did BC Laws Reduce the Takeover Threat? 
 
“Likelihood of being acquired” is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is acquired in the next calendar year. The acquisition 
data are from the Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) database. All other variables are defined in Tables 2 and 3. The coefficients 
are estimated using a multiperiod logit model. Standard errors are clustered at the state of incorporation level. The sample period is 
from 1978 to 1995. z-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable:
Likelihood of Being Acquired
BC -0.182
(1.59)
BC x HHI(Low) -0.318*
(1.82)
BC x HHI(Medium) -0.114
(0.86)














Age Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 77,142 77,142
Adj. R-squared 0.06 0.06
[1] [2]
 Table 7 
Alternative Measures of Competition (All Industries) 
 
HHI (2-digit) and HHI (4-digit) are HHIs based on 2-digit and 4-digit SIC codes, respectively. NPM is operating income before 
depreciation and amortization (Compustat item #13) divided by sales (item #12). Industry NPM is the median NPM in a given year 
and 3-digit SIC industry. All other variables are defined in Tables 2 and 3. The coefficients are estimated using OLS. Standard errors 
are clustered at the state of incorporation level. The sample period is from 1976 to 1995. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
[1] [2] [3]
Dependent Variable: ROA HHI (2-digit) HHI (4-digit) Industry NPM
BC -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.15) (0.11) (0.07)
BC x HHI (2-digit) -0.056***
(5.15)
BC x HHI (4-digit) -0.022***
(3.23)
BC x Industry NPM -0.054***
(3.03)
Industry-year 0.203*** 0.201*** 0.136***
(9.90) (9.72) (9.67)
State-year 0.251*** 0.249*** 0.255***
(8.76) (9.26) (10.98)
Size 0.096*** 0.096*** 0.089***
(19.30) (21.35) (19.40)
Size-squared -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.006***
(18.57) (21.25) (17.98)








Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 77,135 77,446 76,365













 Table 8 
Alternative Measures of Competition (Manufacturing Industries) 
 
HHI (Census) is the HHI based on 4-digit SIC manufacturing industries (SIC 2000-3999) provided by the Census Bureau. The index 
is available for the years 1982, 1987, and 1992 during the sample period. To fill in the missing years, we always use the index value 
from the latest available year. For the years prior to 1982, we use the index value from 1982. “Import penetration” is a dummy vari-
able that equals one if the import penetration in a given 4-digit SIC manufacturing industry lies above the industry mean. Import 
penetration is defined as imports divided by the sum of total shipments minus exports plus imports. The import data are from Peter 
Schott’s webpage and are described in Feenstra (1996) and Feenstra, Romalis and Schott (2002). All other variables are defined in 
Tables 2 and 3. The coefficients are estimated using OLS. Standard errors are clustered at the state of incorporation level. The sample 




Import HHI (Census) &
Penetration Import Penetration
BC -0.003 -0.004 -0.000
(0.83) (0.95) (0.09)
BC x HHI (Compustat)
BC x HHI (Census) -0.081*** -0.104***
(2.84) (2.62)
BC x (1 - Import Penetration) -0.007* -0.007
(1.90) (1.29)
Industry-year 0.148*** 0.177*** 0.154***
(6.21) (8.07) (6.08)
State-year 0.284*** 0.348*** 0.273***
(3.99) (5.87) (2.60)
Size 0.115*** 0.097*** 0.091***
(13.13) (18.57) (13.77)
Size-squared -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.007***
(12.45) (17.55) (13.96)
Age -0.043*** -0.031*** -0.037***
(5.39) (5.12) (5.01)
1 - Import Penetration 0.011*** 0.011**
(3.09) (2.44)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19,244 21,031 17,551
A d j .  R - s q u a r e d 0 . 7 30 . 6 90 . 7 1
Dependent Variable: ROA HHI (Census)Table 9 
Empire Building or Quiet Life? 
 
In Panel (A), capital expenditures (Compustat item #30) are divided by total assets (item #6). Asset growth is the percentage increase 
in total assets from one year to the next. PPE growth is the percentage increase in property, plant, and equipment (item #8) from one 
year to the next. “Acquisition ratio” is the sum of the value of all acquisitions made by the firm in a given year divided by the firm's 
average market capitalization in that year (from CRSP). The acquisition data are from the Securities Data Corporation's (SDC) data-
base. “Likelihood of being acquirer” is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm makes at least one acquisition during the year. In 
Panel (B), selling, general & admin. expenses are SG&A expenses (item #189) divided by total assets. Advertising expenses (item 
#45) and costs of goods sold (item #41) are both divided by sales (item #12). R&D expenses (item #46) are divided by total assets. 
Wages (real) are the natural logarithm of labor and related expenses (item #42) divided by the number of employees (item #29) and 
deflated by the consumer price index from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. All other variables are defined in Tables 2 and 3. For 
brevity, only the coefficients on BC and BC × HHI are reported. The coefficients are estimated using OLS. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the state of incorporation level. The sample period is from 1976 to 1995, except in columns [4] and [5] of Panel (A), where 
the sample period is from 1979 to 1995. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. 
 
Panel (A): Empire Building
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Capital  Likelihood of
Expenditures Being Acquirer
BC -0.000 -0.004 -0.003 0.000 0.003
(0.27) (0.70) (0.53) (0.02) (0.42)
BC x HHI 0.001 -0.004 -0.000 0.001 -0.010
(0.18) (0.39) (0.04) (0.43) (0.48)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 74,435 67,806 64,449 70,248 75,415
Adj. R-squared 0.55 0.35 0.22 0.29 0.36
Panel (B): Quiet Life
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Selling, General & Advertising Costs of
Admin. Expenses Expenses Goods Sold
BC 0.005 0.000 0.001 -0.002 -0.003
(0.80) (0.59) (0.49) (0.20) (0.12)
BC x HHI 0.029** 0.003 0.007 0.053** 0.103**
(2.51) (1.04) (1.39) (2.44) (2.00)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 68,561 28,389 39,359 74,758 8,651
Adj. R-squared 0.81 0.80 0.76 0.60 0.89
Acquisition Ratio
Wages (Real)
Dependent Variable: PPE Growth
Dependent Variable: R&D Expenses
Asset Growth
 Table 10 
Event-Study Results 
 
The methodology used to compute cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) is described in Section 5. The event date is the date of the 
first newspaper report about the BC law. The two-day event window is denoted by [-1,0]. The numbers reported in the table are 
average portfolio CARs based on 19 state portfolios. The 19 states are Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, South Carolina, Virginia, 
Washington, and Wisconsin. The construction of the state-HHI portfolios, bottom-HHI portfolios, and top-HHI portfolios is de-
scribed in Section 5. In Panel (B), the hedge portfolio is long in the top-HHI portfolio and short in the bottom-HHI portfolio. z-
statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel (A): Event-Study Results
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
All Firms HHI (Low) HHI (High) HHI (Low) HHI (Medium) HHI (High)
[-40, -2] 0.98 1.25 0.61 1.51 2.11 -0.30
(1.44) (1.40) (0.49) (1.53) (1.13) (0.04)
[-30, -2] 0.43 0.83 0.08 0.78 0.52 -0.34
(0.94) (1.08) (0.07) (1.02) (0.36) (0.07)
[-20, -2] 0.08 0.15 -0.01 0.33 -0.07 -0.41
(0.53) (0.47) (0.22) (0.78) (-0.03) (0.15)
[-10, -2] 0.52 0.44 0.57 0.44 1.15 0.10
(1.35) (1.31) (0.54) (1.19) (1.24) (0.21)
[-3, -2] -0.02 0.22 -0.24 0.38 0.09 -0.24
(0.05) (0.47) (-0.50) (0.75) (-0.26) (-0.25)
[-1, 0] -0.32*** -0.10 -0.54** 0.08 -0.44* -0.67**
(-2.58) (-1.29) (-2.36) (-0.53) (-1.67) (-2.31)
[1, 2] 0.09 -0.03 0.20 0.01 0.25 0.03
(0.37) (0.07) (0.45) (-0.05) (1.02) (-0.28)
[1, 10] -0.07 0.03 -0.17 0.30 -0.74 -0.27
(-0.08) (0.07) (-0.07) (0.78) (-0.53) (-0.61)
 
 
Panel (B): Hedge Portfolios
HHI Partition Median Terciles Quartiles Quintiles
Bottom-HHI Portfolio -0.10 0.08 0.17 0.19
(-1.29) (-0.53) (-0.62) (-0.64)
Top-HHI Portfolio -0.54** -0.67** -0.75** -0.78**
(-2.36) (-2.31) (-2.44) (-2.49)
Hedge Portfolio 0.44 0.75* 0.92** 0.97**
(1.41) (1.76) (2.02) (2.06)
 
 